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Abstract 
 
For two decades, Melanesianists have sought to reconcile what Robert 
Foster (1995) termed the ‘New Melanesian History’ and the ‘New 
Melanesian Ethnography’. The former describes historically oriented studies 
that critique representations of Melanesian custom as recent objectifications 
of strategically positioned discourses and practices. The latter describes 
culturally oriented, particularist studies that characterize Melanesian 
sociality as an undifferentiated plane of being without integral a priori units; 
on every scale, human agency must individuate persons and collectivities by 
means of ‘fraction’, ‘de-conception’, and ‘decomposition’. In this article I 
present data from Solomon Islands that resist analysis in terms of an 
unqualified both/and synthesis of these orientations. Specifically, I argue 
that articulations of matrilineal connections to land among the Arosi of 
Makira are neither merely postcolonial reifications of custom nor 
historically conditioned ‘depluralizations’ from an always pre-constituted 
social pleroma. Through historically situated case studies, I show how Arosi 
land disputes both reproduce and revalue matrilineally defined categories, 
each understood as the humanized continuation of an autonomous 
primordial essence. Recognition of the continuing importance of these 
categories among Arosi highlights what the New Melanesian Ethnography 
has obscured: that some Melanesians confront a historically transforming 
problem of how pre-existent parts fit together to make up social totalities. 
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In a series of publications with significant comparative implications for 
Oceanist anthropology, Edvard Hviding (1993, 1996, 2003) analyzes 
unilineal representations of social structure in relation to marine and land 
tenure in Marovo Lagoon (Western Province, Solomon Islands) as instances 
of ‘indigenous essentialism’ in the face of neocolonial development 
pressures. Hviding shows how Marovo people truncate the complex, 
flexible and potentially limitless cognatic and bilateral mode of relatedness 
they call butubutu in order to isolate simple unilineal principles of rights to 
land when negotiating with global business and development interests. 
Sometimes, he reports, Marovo people put these attenuated unilineal models 
into practice in ways that bar whole sets of bilateral kindred from claims to 
marine and land rights that might otherwise find support in the broader 
category of butubutu. At other times, he argues, they debate competing 
unilineal constructions of their customary land tenure and strategically play 
them against one another to frustrate resource extraction they do not want. 
In both types of situation, interaction with external agents elicits partial 
essentializations of Marovo thought and practice and precipitates internal 
disputes (cf. Foale and Macintyre 2000). 
In ways that crystallize challenges to any analysis that appears to 
take indigenous representations of customary land tenure based on unilineal 
descent at face value, Hviding’s interpretations of such phenomena in 
Marovo intersect with and reinforce the insights of the two most influential 
theoretical orientations in current Melanesianist anthropology—namely, 
those that Robert Foster (1995, drawing on Josephides 1991) has labelled 
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the ‘New Melanesian Ethnography’ and the ‘New Melanesian History’ (cf. 
Jorgensen 2001). 
The New Melanesian Ethnography refers to the development and 
application of the so-called Melanesian model of sociality associated with 
Marilyn Strathern, Roy Wagner and others. Motivated in part by the 
inability of classic descent theory to describe sociality in Highland New 
Guinea, contributors to this model and their forerunners have emphasized 
that descent in Melanesia is either cognatic or—even where indigenously 
figured as unilineal—implies recursive relations of male/female 
complementarity (e.g. Lawrence 1984; Scheffler 1965; Strathern 1988, 
1992a: Chapter 5; J. Weiner 1988). Kinship is, accordingly, bilateral and 
unbounded, situating persons as the partible composites of pre-existing, 
ongoing relations. Given this immanent and always present sociality 
(Strathern 1992a: 74, 83), diverse symbolic acts and forms reveal or eclipse 
selected layers of social relations to precipitate partial, fluid identities at 
particular moments. These fluid identities are, furthermore, according to 
some, situated within a larger cosmos of essential unity in which the 
precipitation of particular implicit social relations and identities is analogous 
to the precipitation of relations and differences at every level (Wagner 1967, 
1977; J. Weiner 1988; cf. Gell 1999, on Mimica 1988; Strathern 1995: 15-
22). 
Although Hviding (2003) does not analyze Marovo sociality as a 
Solomon Islands token of this type of Melanesian sociality, the structure and 
language of his discussion suggest that he recognizes important parallels 
between the two. In particular, Hviding rehearses the same history of the 
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deconstruction of anthropological descent theory that informs the New 
Melanesian Ethnography to make the point that Marovo sociality is, if not 
part of a total cosmic flow, at least a local flow in which people say that 
‘everyone is related to everyone’. Thus, as modelled by Strathern for 
Melanesia in general, for Marovo people there are no absolute and fixed 
social identities but a plenitude of relations within which ‘complex 
polysemous categories’ are needed in order to ‘identify, establish, activate 
and de-activate relations among people’ (Hviding 2003: 93; cf. 1996: 131). 
Taken together, then, both the situation in Marovo and the New Melanesian 
Ethnography promote a presumption that indigenous representations of 
unilineal identities are likely to be elicitations—exaggerations, in Hviding’s 
(1993: 813) terms—of one aspect of sociality at the temporary expense of 
others. They are partial identities released in a process of decomposition 
through which ‘forms appear out of other forms’ (Strathern 1992b: 245, in 
Hviding 2003: 73). 
A different approach—what Foster dubs the New Melanesian 
History—has shown that indigenous appeals to custom (kastom or kastam in 
many Melanesian pidgins), including representations of social relations and 
land tenure, must be contextualized as emergent within colonial and 
postcolonial history. While rejecting the idea that reifications of tradition in 
current Pacific Island discourses are culturally inauthentic, contributors to 
this approach have nevertheless emphasized that, precisely because such 
objectifications are always the mutable products of ongoing social relations, 
‘what appears customary may be much more recent than it would seem at 
first glance’ (Carrier 1992: 19). Much of the literature that constitutes the 
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New Melanesian History aims, therefore, to situate Melanesian discourses 
and practices as creative responses to confrontation with an external other 
(e.g. Keesing and Tonkinson 1982; Keesing 1992), or as artefacts of a 
shared history of ‘entanglement’ (e.g. Errington and Gewertz 1995; Thomas 
1991). 
Hviding acknowledges that Marovo people activate and de-activate 
different aspects of their sociality in ‘any number of contexts, external and 
internal’ (2003: 104), yet his concentration on how they do so as a culturally 
consistent means of managing encounters with outsiders effectively brings 
the New Melanesian Ethnography together with the New Melanesian 
History (2003: 72-73, 81; cf. 1996: esp. Chapter 8). Hviding’s argument that 
Marovo people deploy essentialized models of their sociality in 
‘intercultural encounters’ (2003: 100) in ways that extend their intra- and 
inter-butubutu modes of interaction points, I suggest, to a certain formal 
congruency between these analytical approaches (cf. Foster 1995: 8). Both 
approaches assume that there are no static pre-constituted social identities, 
groups, or even societies, and that, in a world of constant social flows, these 
entities are generated and transformed through social interaction (see esp. 
Carrier 1992: 19). It could be said, therefore, that human sociality at large—
like Marovo and other Melanesian forms of sociality—is a process of 
mutual difference and identity elicitation through engagement; or, put 
differently, the Melanesian model of sociality can function analytically as a 
putatively regional and cultural variant of a universal process, a point to 
which I return in my conclusion. 
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Furthermore, Hviding’s analysis, according to which—not the 
content—but the process of Marovo kastom formulations in relations with 
outsiders exemplifies an enduring cultural practice, may be read as 
reconciling a tension between these two approaches (cf. Foster 1995: 3; 
Jorgensen 2001: 103-105). If, as he intimates, Strathern essentializes 
Melanesian culture as a ‘time- and placeless status quo’ (Hviding 2003: 72; 
but see Strathern 1988: 16), he provides a case study of how, to the extent 
that Marovo sociality exhibits key features of Strathern’s model, this 
culturally particular sociality is inherently a process of continuous historical 
transformation ‘generative of new forms in and beyond’ local contexts 
(Hviding 2003: 79). In this way, through a focus on cultural processes rather 
than content in indigenous essentialism, Hviding’s implicit coordination of 
the New Melanesian Ethnography and the New Melanesian History 
acknowledges an important element of cultural continuity in historical 
change. At the same time, however, the Marovo case and these two 
analytical approaches combine to cast doubt on the long-standing character 
and centrality of the cultural content of land claims in Melanesia that appeal 
to unilineal identities. 
Against this weight of counterindicative ethnography and theoretical 
resistance, my aim in this article is to show that articulations of matrilineal 
connection to place among the Arosi of the island of Makira (Makira/Ulawa 
Province, Solomon Islands) are more than the partial delimitations of a 
broader sociality precipitated by the socio-political entanglements of the 
recent past. With due consideration of the ways in which colonial history 
has made land tenure a central concern among Arosi, I acknowledge that 
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Arosi do indeed essentialize the relationship between a matrilineage and its 
territory as a given isomorphism. Through analysis of the distinctive 
features of Arosi land disputes, I also argue, however, that they do so in 
ways that recover and revalue culturally persistent mythic models of 
ultimate origins and narratives of place-making. These models represent 
Arosi socio-spatial order as predicated on an original plurality of 
autonomous pre-human categories of being that give rise to human 
matrilineages via transformative processes of inter-relationship and 
territorial emplacement. Yet, despite being constituted by processes of inter-
relationship, human matrilineages remain, according to Arosi, 
fundamentally different: each is the bearer of a unique essence 
consubstantial with the essence of a particular pre-human category; 
collectively, they reproduce the plurality of the pre-human categories as an 
ongoing plurality of fundamental elements. When Arosi today seek to 
secure their matrilineal ties to land, they index these mythic models and 
narratives in discourses and practices that collapse the distinction between 
actual matrilineages and their core essences and objectify the unity of a 
matrilineage with its territory as a pre-constituted, static whole. 
These Arosi understandings of a primordial and continuous plurality 
of fundamental elements resist analysis in terms of the always-ongoing 
plenitude of relations modelled in the New Melanesian Ethnography. In a 
manner analogous to some mortuary rituals elsewhere in Melanesia (e.g. 
Fortune 1932; Foster 1990, 1995; Macintyre 1987, 1989; Thune 1989; A. 
Weiner 1978, 1980, 1988), Arosi essentializations of their landholding 
matrilineages disarticulate matrilineal identities from a wider sociality.  In 
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Arosi—and perhaps in some of these mortuary contexts as well—this 
process effects an approximate return to a mythic primordial condition in 
which autonomous pre-human categories existed in absolute isolation. 
Recognition of this fact highlights what the New Melanesian Ethnography 
has so far obscured: practices that reassert primordiality in this way indicate 
that some Melanesians conceptualize something antecedent to, prerequisite 
for, and ultimately beyond the plenitude of all possible relations. Some 
Melanesians, it seems, recognize irreducible elementary essences 
characterized by an original absence of external relations (contra Strathern 
1992a: 74). 
 
Arosi representations of matriliny and land tenure 
Arosi assert that the ongoing essential unity of a matrilineage, often termed 
a waipo (umbilical cord), remains pure despite the exogamous ‘mixing of 
blood’ (‘abu haidorari) that situates each lineage member in a particular 
bilateral kindred. For Arosi there is a fundamental difference between their 
connection to members of their own matrilineage and their connection to 
other kin. The former is regarded as an inherent, permanent 
consubstantiality; the latter a socially achieved, temporary intermingling. 
Whereas the members of a waipo are ‘simply one’ (ta‘i moi), relatedness to 
a matrilineage and its ancestral spirits through a male diminishes 
generationally, as does relatedness between the descendants of two opposite 
sex siblings. The shared blood said to constitute the latter types of 
relatedness is thought to become increasingly diluted. After a debated 
number of generations, the descendants have become ‘different people’. 
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One man pointed this contrast precisely: ‘A waipo is long; the father’s blood 
is just short.’ 
Matrilineages that are said to be autochthonous to the island of 
Makira are called auhenua. The word auhenua is a compound of au, 
meaning ‘person’ or ‘thing’, and henua, the Arosi exemplar of a widespread 
group of Austronesian cognates for ‘land’. Arosi use this compound to refer 
to any denizen, object, or quality intrinsic to Makira. Rocks, birds, mythical 
beings, spirits, ethical norms, and human matrilineages can all be auhenua. 
At the same time, to describe a matrilineage as the auhenua of a particular 
area of land is to specify that the matrilineage alone is irrevocably joined to 
that area and exercises control over it by virtue of a long history of ancestral 
habitation. Thus, in addition to signifying a given connection to the island as 
a whole, auhenua also denotes an achieved connection between a 
matrilineage and its exclusive territory, established in the past through the 
deeds and deaths of ancestors. 
Members of the auhenua matrilineage of a particular area ought to 
be able to navigate through, direct activity, and know the ancestral powers 
and sites in their territory with reference to a genealogically ordered lineage 
narrative (mamaani auhenua). Examples of what James Fox (1997) terms 
narratives of topogeny, such accounts describe how lineage ancestors 
entered into and made land their own by clearing and settling it, building 
ossuaries and ancestral shrines (both called hera) and shrines (birubiru) 
dedicated to spirit-sharks, placing tabus to govern behaviour at specific 
places and leaving their personal names in association with certain 
localities. Although only a few especially knowledgeable members of a 
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matrilineage will know the full mamaani auhenua—beginning as far back 
as twelve generations—these knowledgeable people should ensure that 
other lineage members know enough about their sacred sites, ancestral 
spirits, tabus and the extent of their land to live and behave appropriately 
vis-à-vis non-lineage relatives, neighbours, and the dead. 
Strict lineage exogamy and a preference for patri-virilocal residence 
patterns contribute to an ideal model of Arosi polities as multi-lineal 
communities in which those who understand themselves to be 
representatives of the auhenua matrilineage of the place act as benefactors 
to the sae boboi, or ‘people who have come from elsewhere’. As the socio-
spatial centres of multi-lineal polities, the auhenua of the place should be 
magnanimous to outsiders, placing them on the land, granting them the use 
of food sources and building materials, pooling resources for bride price and 
feasts on behalf of non-lineage residents, and settling disputes among them. 
The auhenua should promote cohesion and stability without becoming 
overbearing and making others feel unwanted. Early ethnographic sources 
for Makira support the Arosi assertion that, in the precolonial past, 
matrilineages installed specially anointed chiefs to maintain a balance 
between the precedence and prerogatives of the auhenua in their land and 
the needs and interests of the sae boboi (Fox 1924; Verguet 1885; cf. Scott 
2000). 
Although most Arosi would validate the theory of matrilineally-
based sociality and land tenure outlined above as their true kastom, they 
acknowledge that this system is no longer viable owing to the demise of 
many auhenua matrilineages during the nineteenth and early twentieth 
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centuries. As in other Pacific contexts, the arrival of Europeans in Arosi 
brought new diseases that caused heavy mortality. Partly as a means of 
combating disease and depopulation, colonial administrators of the British 
Solomon Islands Protectorate sought to relocate Makirans living in the bush 
to collectivized coastal villages in the early twentieth century. As a result, 
Arosi today regularly assert that the auhenua matrilineages of the coast 
where nearly everyone now lives are extinct and that the current residents 
are all sae boboi. Moreover, when questioned about the history of the often 
weathered or overgrown remains of pre-Christian ossuaries and shrines still 
visible in the landscape, people admit that they do not know who made them 
or whose bones might be deposited in them. They are spoken of as the 
vestiges of the matrilineages that once were auhenua in the coastal villages. 
While many Arosi are willing to consider the possibility that the ancestral 
spirits of the old matrilineages remain powerful in the land, more than a 
century of Arosi Anglicanism has opened debate about the moral nature, 
power, and position of ancestral spirits in relationship to the Christian God. 
In this context of uncertainty and ambiguity and without 
acknowledged auhenua matrilineages occupying their lands, people in Arosi 
today usually explain their residence and gardening patterns with reference 
to a socio-spatial reorganization sometime in the mid to late nineteenth 
century under the auspices of ‘the people of old’. Construed either as the 
last remnant of the old coastal auhenua or as senior men appointed by them 
to oversee their lands after their deaths, the people of old are said to have 
settled many of the male forebears of present-day Arosi in particular village 
hamlets and to have assigned them tracts of gardening land stretching from 
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the villages up into the bush. Ostensibly, then, a land tenure system of father 
to son transmission has been in practice since the time of the people of old.1 
Arosi say that, in the past, members of an auhenua lineage living on their 
land could claim to ‘eat through the mother’. Today, however, everyone 
‘eats through the father’; that is, everyone’s access to land and its 
productivity comes only through the father. 
 
Heterotopia in Arosi: case studies 
Open assertions that ‘we are all sae boboi’ and that ‘everyone here eats 
through the father’ notwithstanding, in confidential conversations with 
kastom experts, I discovered that members of several matrilineages are 
quietly engaging in practices that express and produce competing auhenua 
identities in relation to areas of coastal land. These practices take three main 
forms. In some cases, representatives of different matrilineages are working 
out and even writing down genealogical narratives that implicitly lay claim 
to land in the vicinity of the same coastal ossuaries and shrines. More rarely, 
some people are alleged to have constructed spurious shrines with the aim 
of passing them off as genuine indices of their ancestral precedence. Other 
matrilineages are striving to assert control over particular personal names 
thought to confer agency over contested places. Unlike land disputes 
elsewhere in the Solomons (e.g. Burt 1994a; Foale and Macintyre 2000; 
Hviding 2003: 85-86; Schneider 1998), the conflicts that these practices 
define and generate remain largely covert, silenced by the ethical norm 
according to which the auhenua of the place should not crassly assert their 
status and authority. To be seen to do so is, in fact, to open oneself to the 
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accusation of being an impostor. As the following case studies reveal, latent 
land disputes are imperceptibly constructing the Arosi coast as a 
‘heterotopia’, a context ‘capable of juxtaposing in a single real place several 
spaces, several sites that are in themselves incompatible’ (Foucault 1986: 
25). 
No doubt hoping that I might recognize and openly declare their 
auhenua identities in ways they felt they could not do themselves, a number 
of Arosi made me privy to recitations of their lineage narratives and written 
kastom books. It soon became apparent that representatives of several 
matrilineages were revealing narratives that emplaced their auhenua 
identities in intersecting ways by incorporating some of the same sites and 
spirit powers into supposedly unique histories of ancestral activity. A 
particularly striking instance of this mode of heterotopia production 
involves three matrilineages that understand themselves to be the auhenua 
within an area of Arosi that runs along the coast for approximately seven 
kilometres and up into the bush for approximately eight kilometres. 
Lineage A says that it controls a spirit-shark shrine (birubiru) called 
Eta on the slopes above the site of an old littoral village. Although not in the 
physical centre of the lineage’s territory, Eta is a symbolic centre for 
Lineage A because it marks the birthplace of the lineage’s mythical apical 
ancestress. Lineage A also claims a small constellation of shrines loosely 
connected to one another through the cult of a spirit-shark named Misu. 
According to Lineage A, an ancestor named Ramo used to offer sacrifice to 
Misu and another spirit-shark called Uhi at a coastal birubiru called Rua 
located near a small promontory in the eastern part of the lineage’s land. 
 14 
Representatives of Lineage A told me that the lineage had other birubiru 
strung along the coast to the west of Rua, but did not give me any details 
about them. Up in the bush, they identified two shrines as falling within 
their orbit. Above Eta one first encounters the shrine called Oru where a 
stone and a resident snake are both said to be images of the same spirit-
shark, Misu, to whom Ramo sacrificed on the coast. Still further up in the 
interior beyond Oru lies the shrine known as Hai. 
An elderly custodian of Lineage B’s narrative told me that the 
symbolic centre of his lineage’s territory was Rua, the shrine located near a 
small finger of land jutting into the sea at the eastern end of Lineage A’s 
supposed territory. ‘Rua’, he explained, ‘is the central birubiru and [our 
other shrines were] spread out from there.’ He identified the ‘leading’ spirit-
shark at Rua as Bare‘o and said that Misu—Lineage A’s leading spirit-
shark—was just one of several lesser sharks there. For Lineage B, Bare‘o is 
also the head spirit-shark at Oru birubiru in the bush. This man also named 
three birubiru that out-marrying members of Lineage B had been permitted 
to establish on the land of other lineages in eastern Arosi, elsewhere on 
Makira, and on the neighbouring island of Ugi. Each of these shrines had a 
different head spirit-shark and, taken together with Oru, formed a network 
of satellite shrines around Rua. A young woman of Lineage B, from whom I 
learned about the western part of the lineage’s territory, indicated that there 
is another birubiru tied into this constellation situated west of the others on 
a similar coastal outcrop. Here, she said, two different spirit-sharks, one of 
which has a distinctive hybrid animal form, dwell at the shrine called Ono. 
 15 
At a village very near to Ono there is an additional ossuary called Rima that 
Lineage B regards as one of its ancestral burial grounds. 
Lineage C, like Lineage A, began near Eta. For Lineage C, this area 
is associated with a man called Saemwane. This lineage ancestor transported 
stones associated with a spirit-shark—also called Misu—away from this 
nucleus to establish other shrines down the coast to the west and then up 
into the bush. Saemwane first went along the coast placing stones at Biu 
where an old woman lived and at Rima where a brother and sister lived 
together. Saemwane also carried stones from Eta up into the bush to 
establish shrines at Oru, Waru, Hai and three additional sites. At all of these 
shrines, members of Lineage C offered uncooked pig and food to Misu. The 
lineage also gave burnt offerings to Misu at the Ono shrine in the west of the 
territory and at the Siwa shrine near the eastern end of the land. Like 
Lineages A and B, Lineage C claims the Rua birubiru. A recognized 
Lineage C authority told me that two male ancestors, Memeapu and Ria, 
looked after the offerings to Misu at that site. 
Because each matrilineage uses different rivers to demarcate the 
eastern and western boundaries of its land, the three lineage territories are 
not absolutely congruent. Nevertheless, the three lineages independently 
construct their overlapping identities over the same core terrain. The main 
nodes of intersection among the three accounts are Rua birubiru on the 
coast and the Oru shrine in the bush. Each of the lineages claims the spirit-
shark Misu as a power uniquely associated with its lineage, either as its only 
spirit-shark (Lineage C) or as one among a distinctive group of related 
sharks (Lineages A and B). Four additional sites are contested by two out of 
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the three lineages. Lineages A and C both refer to the Eta shrine as the 
starting point for the dispersal of their lineages and also claim Hai shrine. 
Equally invested in these two focal points, Lineages A and C nevertheless 
situate them in very different multifocal networks. Similarly, Lineages B 
and C both consider Ono shrine to be a place where their ancestors offered 
burnt sacrifices to spirit-sharks peculiar to them. Representatives of 
Lineages B and C also told me that Rima was an important ancestral site. 
Although not involved in open contestation or court cases against 
one another, these three matrilineages are aware of one another as rivals. 
Anxious to avoid confrontation but equally concerned to defend themselves 
against one another’s potential claims, they employ narrative techniques of 
subversion that I discerned at work in other similar disputes (Scott 
forthcoming). While closely guarding their own versions of ancestral events, 
parties to such disputes are on the lookout to pick up information about their 
rivals’ versions in order to introduce refuting representations into their own. 
Once seized upon, details from one lineage’s narrative may be revalued by 
being recontextualized in another’s or may be directly contradicted in 
editorial asides. Thus, for example, Lineage A stakes its claim to auhenua 
status around Eta through an important matrilineal ancestress, but Lineage C 
subverts the import of this claim by casting this woman as a person from 
elsewhere who married a man of their matrilineage. At the same time, all 
three matrilineages refer to themselves by the same lineage name and regard 
one another as pretenders who are just ‘telling lies’ (cf. Burt 2001). 
A less common indicator of heterotopia is the actual or rumoured 
manufacture of new ‘ancestral’ sites. No such incidents occurred during the 
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period of my field research, but I learned of a few purported cases from the 
recent past, at least one of which occurred in connection with a court action 
over land. This type of activity involves the surreptitious relocation of the 
small rock forms known as shark stones (hau ba‘ewa, or simply ba‘ewa) 
formerly used in the construction of birubiru dedicated to spirit-sharks. 
Representatives of a number of lineages told me that these stones are 
‘images of the sharks’ to which their ancestors once offered sacrifices. 
Some appear to have been worked into tubular or S-curved shapes; others 
have been naturally smoothed and rounded (cf. Fox 1924: 286-287). Those 
who are supposed to have tampered with birubiru are said to have 
absconded with these elements of existing shrines in order to ensconce them 
in new structures they could point to as marks of their matrilineal ancestors’ 
formative deeds in the land. 
The most notorious case of shrine creation occurred approximately 
thirty years ago. I learned about this case while walking along the coast with 
a friend to visit Bwaaniwai, an elderly party to the incident. My traveling 
companion told me that Mae, the shrine builder in this affair, stole a shark 
stone from an old shrine near Bwaaniwai’s village. Allegedly, Mae took the 
stone to use as the centrepiece of a birubiru he was secretly constructing. 
When he had completed his birubiru, Mae argued in local court that it was 
an old shrine that proved his ancestors had formerly lived in the land he was 
claiming. My friend expressed the generally held opinion that Mae won his 
case thanks to the counterfeit birubiru. After Mae’s death, another man, 
who claimed to know where Mae had acquired the stone, told Bwaaniwai to 
take it back to where it really belonged. When I interviewed Bwaaniwai he 
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confirmed the details of my friend’s account and, showing me the stone, 
described how he had retrieved it. He told me some of the stories associated 
with it and explained that, after the last unbaptized person to sacrifice at the 
shrine had died, the spirit-shark had gone wild and had ‘just swum away’. 
Some months following my conversation with Bwaaniwai, yet a third man, 
who lived near Bwaaniwai’s village, gave me the same basic account of 
Mae’s theft. But this man asserted that, although Bwaaniwai has the stone in 
his possession, it does not belong to Bwaaniwai’s lineage. He went on to 
give me a detailed narrative of his own lineage, the shark stone, and the 
spirit-shark. Advising me that several of the people who had recently 
manipulated or kept the stone had dreamt that they were the victims of shark 
attacks, this man wryly noted: ‘If I worked this birubiru, all these people 
would truly have been eaten by the shark.’ 
Other more recent examples run along similar lines. One young man 
stated his belief that, like Mae, one of his fellow villagers had moved a long 
white shark stone from a neighbouring village and furtively relocated it to a 
disputed area of land. My consultant in this case, himself a party to the 
dispute, suggested that the man had intended to fabricate a false shrine. At 
the time of our conversation, this friction, like most Arosi disagreements 
about land, remained part of a live but latent feud. Another interlocutor, a 
middle-aged woman, also claimed to have been the victim of shrine theft 
and went so far as to characterize the present tensions surrounding land to a 
perpetual, if undeclared, state of war. Implying that the culprits would be 
punished by offended spirit-sharks, she commented: ‘They don’t live well or 
long because of it. But you know war; they want to win.’2
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Lineage personal names are also susceptible to theft and assimilation 
by rival lineages in ways that map divergent readings of coastal land. Arosi 
matrilineages maintain and reuse sets of ancestral personal names, each 
putatively proper to one lineage alone. Some names are regarded as 
endowing those who hold them with special efficacy and authority over land 
modified by the foundational acts or residence histories of namesake 
ancestors. When a child is given such a name it is with the intention that he 
or she will come to live at and look after the land with which the name is 
associated and hold it for the matrilineage to which the name belongs. The 
same Arosi term, adaro, means both a personal name belonging to a 
deceased person and an ancestral spirit. Thus, recycling a personal name—
an adaro—revivifies a distinct ancestral spirit—an adaro—so that the name 
and the ancestor simultaneously link the child to an area of land. Although 
various names are said to be exclusive to a given matrilineage, this does not 
mean that only members of the matrilineage may receive them. To the 
contrary, lineages routinely bestow their personal names on children of 
lineage males as a means of activating relatedness with them and investing 
them with some of the lineage’s resources and privileges (cf. Fox 1924: 
302). As a result, name-based claims to auhenua identity at a place—
although regularly relied on by many would-be auhenua—are relatively 
weak and vulnerable to contradiction precisely because names have histories 
of interlineage circulation. As described below, accounts of past namings 
frequently indicate that different matrilineages regard the same names, 
along with the lands they govern, as having originated solely with them. 
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Lineages D and E hold conflicting perspectives regarding the name 
Atana and the area of coastline to which it is connected. Representatives of 
both lineages state that the first person to bear this name, Atana 1, lived at a 
place called X where his matrilineage was auhenua. Furthermore, both 
lineages agree that Atana 1’s son, Bwaru, having no children of his own, 
bestowed his father’s name on the firstborn of a woman, Urao, who lived at 
a place called Y. As a result, Urao’s son, Atana 2, currently controls the 
land at X. Lineage D maintains that the woman Urao and Atana 1 were both 
members of their lineage and that the places X and Y both fall within their 
territory. Therefore, from their point of view, when Bwaru named Urao’s 
son Atana 2, Bwaru was simply keeping the name, along with oversight of 
the place X, within the lineage to which they belong. In contrast, Lineage E 
maintains that Atana 1 was a member of their lineage, but that Urao was 
not, and that her son Atana 2 now looks after part of their territory although 
he is not of their lineage. They argue that although Bwaru, as the son of 
Atana 1, was welcome to live at X, he was not auhenua there and had no 
authority to give his father’s name to Urao’s son. Therefore, from Lineage 
E’s point of view, Bwaru ‘sent away’ part of their land by bestowing one of 
their names without their consent. 
Present-day Arosi naming practices both respond to and compound 
this type of dissension. Fearful that they are losing control of their names 
and, with them, portions of their territories, many matrilineages are seeking 
to ‘hold firmly’ onto names they take to be powerful residues of their unique 
auhenua histories in the land. This can mean that members of a matrilineage 
will attempt to build up their auhenua self-understanding in the form of a 
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cache of esoteric personal names withheld from circulation even within the 
lineage. Those who advocate this strategy seem to think that, beyond 
ensuring that the matrilineage’s adaro are kept safe from misappropriation, 
it also recoups the essential power of the adaro for the lineage even when 
they are not put to use as a means of placing people on the land. At the same 
time, to ‘hold firmly’ onto names can also involve actively deploying them 
within the lineage to counterbalance the power that non-lineage persons 
currently bearing the names may try to exercise over land. Although Arosi 
acknowledge that this latter strategy, which allows two living persons to 
bear the same name at once, is contrary to kastom, those who use it see it as 
a necessary effort ‘to bring back’ the names rightfully belonging to their 
matrilineages.3
These case studies of mutually disqualifying lineage narratives, 
shrine theft and fabrication, and holding firmly to lineage personal names all 
uncover the heterotopic composition of the Arosi coastline today as a 
landscape at once devoid of recognized auhenua and constituted by a 
multiplicity of clandestine auhenua. In the following section I explore the 
multi-causal nature of this situation, arguing that Arosi heterotopia is best 
understood as the historically contingent transformative intensification of 
ongoing indigenous processes. Interpreting colonial land policies as threats 
that land seen to be empty would be taken away from them, Arosi have, 
since the early twentieth century, been fearful that an inability to point to 
customary landowners in situ may lead to loss of land to outsiders. 
Additionally, and increasingly, the prospect of development or resource 
extraction is motivating Arosi to prepare to put themselves forward as the 
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rightful customary landowners who must be consulted. I suggest, however, 
that these factors are not introducing a dynamic of auhenua identity 
production that is alien to or previously absent from the Arosi context. 
Rather, these factors are inspiring Arosi to innovate the practices described 
above by recovering and revaluing ancestral practices modelled in Arosi 
understandings of coming into being as a constant transition from an 
original condition of spatially sequestered pre-human categories to an 
achieved condition of emplaced and socially entangled matrilineages. 
 
A tale of two vacuities: colonial and Arosi visions of empty land 
The current efflorescence of auhenua identities on the Arosi coast may be 
explained in part as a response to events and ideas of the past 100 years that 
have inculcated a concern among Arosi that land perceived by outsiders to 
be unoccupied or unworked is vulnerable to appropriation. As elsewhere in 
the British empire, colonial officials in the Solomons approached land and 
resource management informed by a long tradition of moral philosophy and 
law according to which unimproved land, even where inhabited, might 
justifiably be taken over and developed for the greater good. They operated, 
in Judith Bennett’s apt phrasing, with ‘the Western settler view that idle 
land was anathema’ (2000: 182; cf. Williams 1986: 109-138). 
Consequently, between 1896 and 1913 the Protectorate allowed 
approximately 240,000 acres of Solomon Islands land to be alienated under 
regulations that, first, recognized the category of land ‘vacant by reason of 
the extinction of the original native owners and their descendants’ and, later, 
defined ‘waste land’ as ‘land which is not owned, cultivated or occupied by 
 23 
any native or non-native person’ (Allan 1957: 37-38; cf. Bennett 1987: 125-
149; 2000: 41-42; Heath 1981: 62-66). When Solomon Islanders objected 
that much of this land had been incorrectly identified as ownerless, the 
Protectorate repealed these regulations. But despite the return of half of this 
land to indigenous claimants between 1919 and 1925 (Bennett 2000: 88), 
Islanders remained wary that the colonial government was looking for ways 
to identify and take charge of under-exploited land (Allan 1990: 172; 
Bennett 2000: 147, 151; Heath 1981: 68). 
The post-World War II movement known as Maasina Rule (c. 1944 - 
c. 1952) further heightened people’s fears that foreign or government agents 
were readying to take their land. Variously characterized as a proto-
nationalist movement, a civil rights initiative, a manifestation of anti-
colonial resistance, or a cargo cult, this multiplex movement originated on 
the island of Malaita c. 1944 and was imported to Arosi c. 1946. Contrary to 
Bennett’s (2000: 141) assertion that Maasina Rule was ‘not focused on land 
matters’, I found that many Arosi understood the movement and its 
practices as a campaign aimed to prevent a new influx of foreigners from 
usurping land (Scott 2007: Chapter 3; cf. Akin 1993: 343-344; Allan 1957: 
92; Burt 1994b: 179-181; de Coppet 1998: 190; Fifi‘i 1989: 64; Laracy 
1983: 106-107). Older Arosi recalled having been instructed by leaders of 
the movement to fill up the coastal land in preparation for unknown 
invaders, a process one man referred to as ‘blocking the land’: 
 
All the land was split up. In Maasina Rule we thought any country 
could come—Africa or Malaysia, black people or white people too, 
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America too…But if they wanted land, we’d already taken up all the 
land; so, many places were blocked. 
 
Another man, who had been eleven or twelve years old at the time, 
explained how he and other children had been set to make gardens so that, 
‘If someone came and asked “Does a person live here?” we were to say, 
“Yes.”’ As was typical elsewhere during Maasina Rule, local movement 
leaders in Arosi also directed the remaining bush residents to come down to 
the coast and join newly consolidated villages. Although my consultants did 
not articulate this purpose explicitly, it seems likely that, by reorganizing the 
amalgamated villages into rows, L-shapes or chevrons along the coast, they 
were presenting a scene of total population plenitude to the eyes of anyone 
who might arrive by sea (cf. Davies n.d.: 88-89, 133). 
It must be recognized, therefore, that the impetus among Arosi to 
attach themselves inalienably to their land as the legitimate auhenua has 
emerged in its present form in the context of colonial encroachment and 
indigenous resistance. Although covert rather than collective, current 
representations of auhenua identities are semantically equivalent to earlier 
assertions by Solomon Islanders that ‘there is no such thing as waste land’ 
(Heath 1981: 71; cf. Allan 1957: 287). As late as 1974—four years before 
independence from Britain—a government Select Committee reported that, 
throughout the Solomons, people still condemned the old waste land policy 
as having been wrong ‘because every part of the Solomons was owned by 
some group, even if they did not use it at the time’ (Heath 1981: 72). The 
Arosi discourse that everyone is sae boboi on the coast notwithstanding, 
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representatives of the Arosi matrilineages are, separately and secretly, 
making a similar claim that original customary landowners still hold all the 
land. 
Likewise, the differing rationales Arosi offered for who was placed 
where during Maasina Rule suggest that the heterotopic constructions of 
coastal land encountered in Arosi today either already existed or were taking 
shape in this context. According to some Arosi, people were positioned at 
one place or another depending on their broad inter-lineage entanglements 
with those who had recently lived or gardened in those areas, without 
reference to any putative underlying auhenua matrilineages. Others, 
however, represent these arrangements in ways that presuppose their own 
self-understandings as the auhenua of the places in question. These 
conflicting interpretations reflect the fact that Maasina Rule became, for 
some Arosi, a drive to recover the genealogical histories of their 
matrilineages in order to reaffirm their connections to ancestral territories as 
the only sure defence against dispossession by outsiders (cf. de Coppet and 
Zemp 1978: 106-107; Naitoro 1993: 130). One woman who had been a 
teenager during the movement described how she had been instructed to this 
end: ‘It is a preparation for when they come and ask, “Where is the kastom 
landowner, the auhenua person who has the land?”’ Like this woman, many 
of the kastom experts of today are people who gained their knowledge under 
the guidance of Maasina Rule leaders. 
Clearly, the history of the past century has politicized, foregrounded, 
and objectified customary land tenure in Arosi in ways that are not likely to 
have been prevalent in the precolonial past. The anticipated arrival of 
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logging interests and even gold prospecting was, furthermore, reinvigorating 
these processes in the 1990s. But if recent history and the possibility that 
land may be given new value help to account for why Arosi find it 
necessary to emplace themselves as the true auhenua in their land, it does 
not explain either the particularity of the practices they employ in so doing 
or by what Arosi criteria such practices are meaningful and appropriate. 
Fuller understanding of the practices generating heterotopia today 
additionally requires, I suggest, attention to the way in which the colonial 
quest for empty land has intersected with Arosi conceptualizations of empty 
land as a kind of primordial chaos that, apart from pressures exerted by 
external forces, poses a problem for Arosi sociality in its own terms. 
Under the scrutiny of a colonial gaze in search of waste lands, the 
Arosi gaze has seen in depopulated and socially reorganized land the return 
of a state of chaos envisioned in a variety of Arosi idioms as a condition of 
semantically empty space (Scott 2005). From the Arosi point of view, then, 
the recovery of auhenua identities is more than a defence against land loss 
or a stake in hoped for development revenues, it is also an attempt at 
recovery from a postcolonial situation that Arosi experience as one of 
cosmic entropy and social anarchy. Analyzed at this level of meaning, the 
current practices that are generating heterotopia come into focus as new 
inflexions of ancestral activities designed to bring coherently emplaced 
social order out of a chaos of spatial and moral vacuity. While uniquely 
generated by recent colonial and postcolonial history, these practices 
simultaneously reference and reframe Arosi models of order production that 
entail an ongoing transition between two contrastive modes of primordiality. 
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The first mode, which I term utopic, refers to a vision of ultimate origins 
figured by mythic primordial beings dwelling in asocial purity in 
indeterminate pre-social places. The second mode, which I term topogonic, 
refers to a vision of coming into being figured by the exogamous generation 
of truly human ancestors whose activities fuse matrilineages with distinctive 
socialized territories. 
The clearest representations of the imagined condition I call utopic 
primordiality are accounts of how a variety of mythical beings that became 
the sources of the various Arosi matrilineages appeared spontaneously and 
autonomously at discrete sites around Makira. Mirroring the original 
condition of these mythical beings, these accounts are unrelated narratives 
held separately by the matrilineages without being joined together in a 
unified cosmogony or cycle of origin myths (contrast Bonnemaison 1994). 
Although some of these accounts contain similar narrative material, Arosi 
regard them as unique narratives of unique origins. Thus, some lineages 
describe their progenitors as animate rocks autochthonous to Makira; others 
trace their descent from female snakes; one tells of having been called forth 
by the song of a bird; another says it goes back to a female spirit who 
emerged from a well; and others see themselves as the descendants of the 
quasi-human creatures of popular tales known as masi and pwapwaronga. 
These earliest ancestral beings were not, according to Arosi, ‘true people’ 
(inoni mora); rather, they represented a multiplicity of unrelated essentially 
different categories of being. They gave rise to true people, who in turn gave 
rise to human matrilineages, only when they entered into cross-category 
reproductive relations that anticipated matrilineal exogamy. Before entering 
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into these anthropogonic connections, however, these polygenetic categories 
comprised what might be termed proto-people, instantiating proto-lineages, 
isolated in pre-social or utopic spaces. 
In the same way that fully human matrilineages are imagined as 
coming into being through relations among these pre-human categories, the 
specific territories that matrilineages come to hold are imagined as coming 
into being through relations between incipient matrilineages and land. Prior 
to the establishment of these latter relations, however, Makiran land is a 
social vacuum. Although the various ancestral beings are thought of as 
having appeared spontaneously at different—and thus, differentiating—
spatial points, each such point is aptly described as utopic: in the beginning 
it was literally ‘not-place’. As yet unmodified and unencompassed within a 
wider humanized landscape, these primordial not-places are analogous to 
the proto-people that arise within them; they are, in effect, proto-places. 
Generic and indeterminate, they will not become true places, named and 
contextualized within recognizable lineage territories, until human beings 
form them through activities that are physically and conceptually topogonic. 
The type of genealogically ordered lineage narratives already 
described also reference the utopic mode of primordiality, representing it as 
an antecedent vacuity. Describing the first advent of lineage ancestors in a 
particular place, these narratives treat the land at the time of initial incursion 
as the uninhabited and untouched ‘virgin forest’ (wabu) these ancestors 
were the first to clear. One man articulated this idea clearly when telling me 
the history of his matrilineage’s descent from the island’s interior to the 
coast many generations ago: ‘When we first came down, no other lineage 
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was at the coast here.’ After recounting the formative actions of his 
ancestors in this vacant land, he concluded: ‘So, this is our land here along 
the coast; we have shrines and burial grounds, and no other lineage has such 
things here.’4
Building on James Fox’s (1997) concept of topogeny—a narrative of 
ancestral movement and place-making—I call the phase of primordiality 
described in such narratives the topogonic mode of primordiality. As 
previously seen in the narratives told by Lineages A, B, and C, Arosi 
topogenies tell how ancestral figures move out from and around a particular 
starting point, creating a multifocal field that becomes a lineage territory. By 
establishing new settlements, placing the remains of their dead in the land, 
laying down tabus, attaching their personal names to locales and cultivating 
trees and gardens, these ancestors came to form and be formed by the land 
they appropriated. Land and lineage come into being together; they did not 
and cannot exist apart from one another (cf. Abramson 2000; de Coppet 
1985). Accordingly, land that has never been shaped by a matrilineage is, as 
Remo Guidieri (1980: 62) says of unsettled land among the Fataleka of 
Malaita, a ‘void’ or ‘black hole’ that can threaten a lineage with loss of 
identity. If, for European colonialists, idle land was anathema, for Arosi, 
utopic land is a vacuum that must be filled. To fill this vacuum, to make the 
transition from utopic to topogonic primordiality, is to become the auhenua 
matrilineage in that place. 
When the custodians of lineage knowledge narrate their genealogical 
histories, they usually ‘narrate along the umbilical cord’; that is, they follow 
successive generations through women. At the same time, however, they 
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take for granted—if unaccounted for—the existence of marriageable others 
and sometimes mention the names of in-marrying men. The mode of 
primordiality represented in these narratives pertains, therefore, to three 
distinct but simultaneous processes of coming into being. As well as 
describing how matrilineages acquire identity in relationship to land, these 
narratives also indicate—sometimes directly and sometimes implicitly—that 
the discrete proto-human categories depicted in tales of ultimate origins 
become matrilineages in relationship to one another. Inseparable from these 
two processes, Arosi social order thus emerges as a set of multi-lineal 
polities, each built on the foundation of a particular auhenua matrilineage 
anchored in and sharing the productivity of its land. The multiple dynamics 
of topogonic primordiality suggest, in other words, that processes of 
definitive emplacement are necessary not only for the existence of 
matrilineages per se, but also for the aggregative achievement of a socio-
cosmic order. 
Recognition that emplacement is indispensable to proper sociality 
from the Arosi point of view can, I suggest, enhance understanding of the 
practical methods of, as well as the motivations behind, the current Arosi 
recovery of auhenua identities. In a socially and morally depleted 
postcolonial landscape, experienced as the virtual return of utopic 
primordiality, the heterotopia-producing activities documented in the case 
studies above are new actualizations of the ancestral place- and society-
making processes of topogonic primordiality. By incorporating existing 
sacred sites into lineage narratives, constructing new sacred sites, and 
reclaiming lineage-specific personal names, representatives of the Arosi 
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matrilineages are revivifying the power of topogonic action in order to come 
into being as grounded centres for new social polities on the coast. 
Furthermore, a tension—legible but unresolved in the transition from utopic 
to topogonic primordiality—between being auhenua to Makira and 
becoming the auhenua of a particular territory helps to explain how the 
production of new coastal auhenua may be possible and plausible to Arosi. 
Utopic primordiality presents a model of ultimate origins that permits 
multiple matrilineages to be equally autochthonous without competition 
simply by virtue of their individual beginnings somewhere in the island. 
Topogonic primordiality, however, envisions conditions in which it is 
possible, even likely, that the history of more than one matrilineage will 
impinge on and come to reference the same geographical terrain. And, in 
fact, despite the widely held Arosi conviction that, once formed, the 
connection between a lineage and its land can never be broken, instances 
reported to me of lineage turnover in some areas suggest that, in the past, 
lineages that understood themselves to be auhenua somewhere on the island 
have succeeded in subtly shifting their alignments with space so as to 
become auhenua in lands formerly held by other lineages. Heterotopia, in 
other words, may not be just a thing of the present. 
But this is neither to say that Arosi are enacting routinized mythic 
paradigms nor to say that Arosi socio-cultural order is essentially 
unchanging. When Arosi seek to collect and record their lineage histories 
and retrieve or strategically deploy their lineage personal names, they are 
drawing on received forms that they understand to be repositories of 
ancestral power, but they are not taking these forms as scripts for the 
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repetition of ancestral acts. Rather, in their postcolonial setting of 
semantically evacuated coastal land, they are finding new potential 
meanings in these received forms and recapturing them for the present in 
ways that alter and even invert their apparent previous emphases (cf. 
Kapferer 2003). 
Paradoxically, although informed by ancestral models in their 
struggle to achieve a new transition from utopic to topogonic primordiality, 
Arosi are endowing those models with a socially fragmenting power that 
may be original to the present. Whereas lineage narratives emphasize that 
the generation of matrilineages is a process of coming into being that 
depends on the establishment of relations between pre-existing categories as 
well as with places, the current drive to store up knowledge of such 
narratives creates lineage-cum-land identities as integral to themselves and 
as prerequisite to, rather than the outcome of, proper social relations. 
Similarly, whereas, lineage personal names might formerly have been used 
to specify ties with non-lineage kin, moves today to retrieve names from 
circulation outside the matrilineages represent, not only changes in practice, 
but also a devaluation of non-lineal relatedness that again seeks to reaffirm 
lineage-cum-land identities by extricating them from the very entanglements 
through which, according to narratives of ancestral activity, they were 
formed in the first instance. This extrication is necessary because the 
colonial processes that have rendered coastal land utopic have severed 
matrilineages from their lands but not from one another. Deracinated 
matrilineages, in effect, only partially instantiate the original plurality of 
isolated ontological categories proper to utopic primordiality. Their anti-
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social revaluations of ancestral precedents thus serve as the preliminary 
means to a greater social end: they attempt to complete the approximate 
return of Arosi matrilineages to asocial purity as a new starting point for 
new processes of emplacement and entanglement. In so doing, these 
revaluations tend to conflate the mythic vision of a proto-human category of 
being arising in a discrete but utopic space with the reified image of a 
matrilineage seated in its territory as a pre-constituted entity.5
 
Essential Arosi categories 
To acknowledge that, in the context of postcolonial efforts to secure land, 
Arosi are reconstituting their auhenua identities in ways that disarticulate 
matrilineages from their bilateral entanglements may give the impression 
that Arosi, like the people of Marovo Lagoon, are formulating an indigenous 
essentialism that activates unilineal identities while deactivating others and 
is thus amenable to analysis in terms of the Melanesian model of sociality. 
Without questioning Hviding’s analysis of the situation in Marovo, I 
conclude, nevertheless, with the suggestion that the Melanesian model of 
sociality insufficiently, and thus inaccurately, theorizes Melanesian 
ontologies and socio-cultural contexts such as Arosi. 
Studies of thought and practice in Melanesia that employ the 
Melanesian model of sociality posit a plenitude of relations as an analytical 
starting point and, furthermore, imply that Melanesians do so as well. From 
the perspective of this starting point, all relations are analogous and, apart 
from them, no entities exist autonomously. If this model accurately 
describes—not just the empirical reality of ongoing social relations—but 
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indigenous Melanesian theories of sociality and ontological principles of 
cosmology, then it follows that Melanesians should not be found engaging 
in practices designed to constitute and represent certain categories of being 
as wholly dislocated from relations (cf. Strathern 1992a: 100, 114) or as 
self-sufficient and transcendent (but see Foster 1990; 1995: 215). It ought to 
be contrary to the Melanesian outlook to imagine that it is possible to 
eliminate all relations as superadded and get back to an original immutable 
core essence that can fall into atomistic anomie. As Alfred Gell (1999: 32-
33) pointed out, the Melanesian model of sociality is an idealist model of 
exclusively internal relations that cannot envision a realist ontology 
according to which initial relations are external and must be constructed. 
Yet this is precisely what Arosi appear to envision. The principles of Arosi 
sociality and polygenetic cosmology assert that it is possible to disentangle 
from accumulated ties of relatedness and return to a multiplicity of 
categorical essences that are the starting points on which socio-cosmic order 
is predicated. This process of disentangling may look amenable to analysis 
as decomposition from a plenitude of relations, but the underlying Arosi 
assumption that matrilineages embody autonomous primordial categories of 
being toward which they may revert fundamentally contradicts the 
Melanesian model of sociality, understood as ‘their vision of the world’ 
(Strathern 1992a: 114).6
Confronted with this non-conformity, a Melanesianist committed to 
the model has two options: subordinate Arosi representations of original 
plurality to the terms of the model, taken as the indigenous cultural baseline, 
so that such representations appear as transient ‘cultural fiction’, ‘illusion’, 
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or ‘mirage’ (cf. Foster 1990: 435, 444; 1995: 218), or assert that the model 
is only relevant to the analysis of living human persons, not mythic pre-
human categories or ‘pre-procreation’ states (e.g. Strathern 1992a: 98, 100, 
114-115 n. 4). Either option reveals the limits of the model. The former 
move inverts what I take to be the Arosi perspective; it compels Arosi to 
take as given what their discourses and practices suggest had to be achieved 
and needs constantly to be maintained. A blanket insistence on the 
indigenous prioritization of a fully realized relationality without constituent 
components begins to reveal, I would argue, that the model is less a 
distinctively Melanesian mode of sociality and more our own abstract 
semiotic theory of all relationality. As such, it has no special claim on the 
intellectual allegiance of Melanesianists, but is a general tool for the critique 
of cultural representations anywhere that appear to posit pre-constituted or 
fixed wholes (cf. Gell 1999; Josephides 1991). More problematic, however, 
is the latter move. By restricting its analytical focus to ideas about living 
human persons, the model sacrifices the possibility of differentiating 
between an indigenous ontology that posits a multiplicity of discrete 
categories in need of external relations from one that posits a single 
category in need of internal differentiations. The model, in fact, commits 
one to assimilating all Melanesian ontologies to the mould of monism (Scott 
2007: 24-32). 
Marilyn Strathern, whose work is most closely identified with the 
model, styles it ‘a kind of convenient or controlled fiction’ (1988: 6) 
whereby Melanesian sociality happens to be the approximate realization of 
the hypothetical inverse of Western sociality. By this device it can be said 
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that she never said that the model is the description of an indigenous 
Melanesian outlook. Yet, many Melanesianists assume the model as 
common knowledge about the way Melanesians think and act; 
anthropology’s ‘conventional Melanesian person is relational’ (Foster 2002: 
75; cf. Bamford 1998; Hirsch 2001; Mallett 2003; Reed 2003; Robbins 
2004). Some, including Strathern, have even used the model as a measure 
by which to evaluate the work of other Melanesianists (e.g. Mosko 2000; 
Strathern 1992a: 115 fn. 6). 
Ironically, however, this use of a model originally developed as a 
means of exploring alternative possibilities ends by limiting possibilities. 
Over against modern Westerners who assume the a priori integrity of 
individual selves who must work to collectivize into society, Melanesians 
are cast as living exemplars of theoretical inverse-Westerners who 
experience relatedness as given and must work to free fluid identities from 
an already completed sociality. Unlike other recent critics of the model (e.g. 
Bolyanatz 2000; LiPuma 2000), however, my concern is not that some 
Melanesians may, in fact, understand and comport themselves as 
individuals; my concern is to point out that there are Melanesians who posit 
neither naturally pre-constituted individuals nor a pre-existing pleroma of 
relations. If the current Arosi recovery of auhenua identities is, from one 
perspective, a historically conditioned indigenous essentialization of 
matrilineages as landholding units, it is also the transformation of a 
possibility not fully imagined in Strathern’s thought experiment. It is the 
renovating recovery of a primordial aspatial, asocial condition that, for these 
Melanesians at least, represents the starting point for sociality. This does not 
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mean that living persons are not composite from an Arosi point of view. It 
means that, contrary to the premises of the Melanesian model of sociality, 
and at a conceptual level beyond its analytical scope, the Arosi vision of the 
world does confront a problem of how pre-existent parts fit together into a 
synthetic totality (contrast Strathern 1992a: 114)—a problem Arosi continue 
to address today, not only through mythic representations of a transition 
from utopic to topogonic primordiality, but through new practical 
deployments of those representations that reposition matrilineal 
emplacement as prior to and necessary for the proper socio-spatial 
organization of interlineage entanglements. 
 
Acknowledgements 
This article is based on research conducted between 1992 and 1993 in 
northwest Makira (formerly known as San Cristoval), Solomon Islands, 
supported by the Wenner-Gren Foundation. I am grateful to the government 
of Solomon Islands, Makira/Ulawa Province, and the people of Arosi for 
research permission and generous assistance. For purposes of this paper, 
references to Arosi refer to the council area of Arosi 1. All Arosi personal 
and place names used are pseudonyms. Earlier versions of this paper were 
presented at ‘Recovering the Past’, the Fifth Conference of the European 
Society for Oceanists, Vienna, July 2002, and at the Anthropology Seminar, 
Brunel University, April 2004. I thank the audiences at both venues for their 
helpful questions and responses. Without ascribing to them any of the 
positions here taken, I especially acknowledge Eric Hirsch, Krista Ovist, 
and Christina Toren for constructive engagement with the development of 
 38 
this paper. I am grateful to two anonymous reviewers who prompted helpful 
clarifications. 
 
Endnotes 
 
1. Compare the account of former Lands Commissioner Colin H. Allan 
(1990: 126): ‘the “former people” consistently emerged in the tangle of 
previous land transactions when I was on Makira in 1956. Nowhere else in 
the Solomons did this theme obtrude itself so consistently as on Makira.’ 
 
2. This equation of shrine theft with warfare may signal a measure of 
continuity with the past. Fox (1924: 286) states that the seizure of shark 
stones was an element in pre-Christian Arosi warfare. 
 
3. Annette Weiner (1992) identifies names as among the ‘inalienable 
possessions’ that Trobriand Islands matrilineages temporarily loan out to 
one another in ways that risk permanent loss. I would describe Arosi names 
as mobile extensions of matrilineal essences rather than ‘possessions’, and 
would argue that Arosi attempts to reclaim names represent efforts to defend 
matrilineal power and integrity from a culturally particular—rather than a 
general universal—form of ‘loss and decay’ (A. Weiner 1992: 7). 
Nevertheless, I take the processes of alternating distribution and retraction 
that Weiner describes in relation to such elements of value as comparable to 
those in which Arosi engage in naming. This comparative data suggests, 
furthermore, that the current Arosi retention of names, although apparently 
 39 
novel in its extreme form, captures and privileges anti-social meanings 
already inherent in such forms of engagement in and withdrawal from inter-
lineage exchange. 
 
4. Indigenous ideas about the original emptiness of land settled by ancestral 
pioneers are well documented for the neighbouring island of Malaita (e.g. 
Burt 1994b: 24-25; de Coppet 1985: 80; Guidieri 1980: 41, 62-63; Ivens 
1930: 291-292; Keesing 1992: 23-25; Naitoro 1993: 30). 
 
5. My analysis here is similar in some respects to Thomas Ernst’s (1999) 
analysis of the process he calls ‘entification’ among the Onabasulu (Papua 
New Guinea). Ernst shows how Onabasulu representations of themselves as 
socially and territorially bounded ‘clan’ entities draw on a cosmogonic 
tradition according to which the dismemberment of a primordial being 
created the culturally significant number of seventeen social and spatial 
distinctions. This tradition was not invented de novo in the contemporary 
context of resource extraction; rather, Onabasulu are reframing it in ways 
that strategically redefine and fix social and spatial distinctions. There is a 
critical difference between Onabasulu and Arosi, however: whereas 
Onabasulu ontology appears to posit an original unity in need of internal 
(and potentially fluid) distinctions, Arosi ontology posits an original 
plurality in need of external relations (Scott 2007: 242-243). 
 
6. This is not to deny that one could apply the abstract principles of the 
Melanesian model of sociality to assert that Arosi representations of utopic 
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autonomy and topogonic relatedness logically imply and complement one 
another (cf. Hirsch’s [1995a, 1995b] theorization of the complementary 
modes of ‘background potentiality’ and ‘foreground actuality’). The model 
thus appears able to encompass the autonomy Arosi ascribe to utopic 
categories by casting that autonomy as the ideological inversion of an actual 
plenitude of relations. My point, however, is that to privilege the model in 
this way is to subordinate the ethnography of indigenous perspectives to a 
philosophical perspective of our own. 
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